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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 12:00 Noon
Place: Hotel Beau Rivage
LAUSANNE

Participants:

United States

Mr. Foster
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Buhlen

Germany

Mr. Carstens
Mr. Krapf
Mr. von Hase
Mr. Forster

Subject: Berlin and Disarmament

Copies to:

S/S-ANTHONY	INR/D	Ambassy LONDON (For Amb.)
S/P	Ambassy Bonn (For Amb.)	DOD - Sec. McNamara
G	SecDel	CIA - Mr. McCone
S/B	NSA	The White House
EUR	Ambassy MOSCOW (For Amb.)	
GER	Ambassy PARIS (For Amb.)	

Mr. Kohler said that he did not think it was possible to go on longer with the conversations between Thompson and Grunke; that they had been pretty well used up and both had stated their positions. If there was to be any continuance of these talks, there would have to be a discussion of other subjects if only because the Soviets would surely bring them up. He mentioned in this connection security and the declarations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. He thought it would be much better to make these part of the package on Berlin rather than leave them to the 12-power conference.

Drafted by: GMB:lian Cleared by: Mr. Foster

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DISCUSSION

Mr. Carstens agreed that Mr. Thompson's talks with Grotzke seemed to have run their course and he complimented Ambassador Thompson on his handling of the discussion, but wondered if there was not some desirability of continuing conversations for the sake of conversation. He mentioned that there was a new element in their paper, to which he had already referred, namely, the possibility of increased technical contacts with the East Germans. He said that the crucial point for them was whether it was wise to link Berlin and the disarmament question; that they felt that the Soviets might use any such connection as a basis for the right to intervene in Berlin affairs. For example, the Soviets could claim a breach of non-fulfilment of the other arrangements in order to denounce the agreement on Berlin.

(b)(7) Mr. Kohler replied that he thought it would work the other way around and that these supplementary arrangements would operate to hold the Russians to any agreement on Berlin.)

(a)(5) there was some discussion in regard to the formulation of a Warsaw Pact-NATO Declaration which it was agreed would not involve the question of recognition.

Mr. Kohler remarked that their purpose was not to confine any agreement on security to the Federal Republic but rather to broaden it. It was his view that they should get something in return for a non-diffusion formula. Ambassador Thompson stated that in Moscow there were indications of some uncertainty in Soviet policy and that they were in effect balancing on the edge of some new decisions. It was clear, however, that the Soviets wished to continue the conversations. The party then broke up for lunch.

After lunch they reassembled except for Mr. Kohler who joined the Secretary and the Foreign Minister. Part III of the German paper, i.e., disarmament and security, was discussed.

Mr. Foster said he thought that this was very important in view of the attitude of other NATO countries, as well as the small size of the U. S. Delegation. He said that Mr. McIntyre had been designated regularly as an officer but that others of the Delegation could see the Germans depending upon circumstances. Mr. Kraft agreed with Mr. Foster's remarks and said they would have only one man at the Consulate General for the disarmament consultations and for the short period he and von Hass would be here for consultations on Berlin.

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DISCUSSION

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Mr. Foster inquired what was meant by the word "intercontinental" in Paragraph 9 and was told that this was taken from the Paris paper of last summer and meant that the scope of investigation would be intercontinental and that there could be some posts on the eastern U. S. seaboard as well as posts in the Soviet Union up to the Urals.

Mr. Foster then outlined the U. S. thought as to the possibility of progressive zones of inspection coupled with sampling techniques. He pointed out that they did not envisage a zone in the area of confrontation, i.e., Germany, and that the system would be applied generally. He said that we were working on this concept with our scientists and mathematicians, but that we did not have in mind any particular arrangements with Germany which would involve any form of discrimination. Ambassador Thompson remarked that he assumed that this would not apply to the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Berlin, to which von Hase agreed.

Mr. Foster said that the idea of these areas of zones of inspection had been devised to meet the Soviet objection concerning the alleged American desire to engage in espionage throughout the entire country. It would in effect be a check on the honesty of the declarations which either side made; that this had been briefly discussed in the 1958 surprise attack negotiations. He pointed out that we were well aware of the danger inherent in this system, particularly in its initial implementation; that inspection zones as mentioned by the Germans. But he felt that by its universal application this danger could be avoided. For example, he said if we agreed to let nuclear delivery systems by 1965, then by an inspection in selected areas of the same, we could

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test the honesty of the Soviet declaration and eventually by progression this would end up with 100% inspection. He pointed out the difference between this and the so-called de-nuclearized zones which the Soviets were talking about.

Mr. Foster pointed out that the zone could not be local and that each side would offer several zones for selection by the other.

Mr. Foster pointed out that this project was subject to much study and was primarily to meet the charge that the United States was seeking 100% inspection. He also pointed out that the first zones very possibly might be in the United States and the USSR and that eventually might include the area of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. He also emphasized that sampling plus the zonal system would give a good deal of knowledge as to developments in other parts of the country. For example, if there were 20 zones an inspection of 25% of this number might approximate an over-all coverage of 50% and an inspection of 50% might actually approximate 80-90% coverage.

Mr. Foster concluded by saying that this idea had first been suggested in 1960 and that the combination of zonal inspection with sampling was a later development.

Mr. von Hase in conclusion said that he had one more point to raise, and that was the desire of the German Government to inform the neutrals, not here in Geneva but in their capitals, of the German view on disarmament. This would be merely for information and would not in any way interfere with the disarmament discussions. Mr. Foster said he thought that this would be a very useful move to make.

Attachment: German Paper.

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